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Bluestein v. Bluestein, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 14 (Mar. 26, 2015)1 
 
FAMILY LAW: CHILD CUSTODY 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court held a district court has the authority to review and modify a custodial 
agreement once either party makes a modification request. When modifying a custodial 
agreement, however, the district court must primarily look for the child’s best interest. 
 
Background 
 
 Ellen and Michael Bluestein were married for 13 years, had one child together, and 
divorced in 2004. In their stipulated divorce decree, Michael would have the child from 5 p.m. 
on Thursday to 9:30 a.m. on Sunday, Ellen would have the child for the remainder of the time, 
and the parties would alternate holidays. The stipulation did not cover child support or explicitly 
stated if there was primary or joint physical custody.  
 In 2011, Michael began receiving public assistance and the Nevada Department of Health 
and Human Services sought a reimbursement from Ellen for a portion of Michael’s state aid as 
her child support obligation. Ellen objected and requested that the court designate her as the 
child’s primary physical custodian. Ellen argued that under the custodial agreement Michael only 
had the child 38 percent of the time instead of the 40 percent in accordance with Rivero.2 Under 
Rivero, parents have joint custody when they have the child 40 percent of the time per week. 
 The district court entered an order concluding that Ellen had primary physical custody of 
the child because Michael only had the child 38.393 percent of the time. Michael motioned for 
reconsideration, and the district court held an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary hearing dealt 
with the responsibilities of both parties regarding the child on Thursdays.  The court designated 
Ellen as the child’s primary physical custodian because Ellen had the child over 60 percent of the 
time. The court did not state whether it took into account the child’s best interest. Michael 
appealed and challenged the designation of Ellen as the child’s primary physical custodian. 
 
Discussion 
 
Modifying custody agreements 
 Public policy encourages parents to enter into private custody agreements for co-
parenting.3 These agreements are generally enforceable until one or both of the parties move the 
court to modify the custody agreement. However, once the parties move the court to modify an 
existing custody agreement, the court must use Nevada law. Michael argues that since Ellen did 
not request a change in the timeshare, then the district court lacked authority to modify the 
custody agreement. 
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 The parties’ agreement to share joint physical custody controlled until Ellen asked the 
court to designate her as the primary physical custodian. Ellen did not request a modification to 
the timeshare, but she did request a modification to the physical custodial agreement. The district 
court has the authority to review timeshare arrangements and determine whether the parties 
shared joint physical custody under Nevada law. Since the district court has proper authority, it 
could modify the agreement accordingly.  
 
Child’s best interest is paramount when modifying custody 
 Whenever an issue of custody modification is brought before the court, the court must 
consider whether such modification is in the child’s best interest.4 Here the district court used the 
40 percent test in Rivero instead of considering the child’s best interest. In Rivero, the parties 
agreed to joint physical custody but created a timeshare agreement where the mother had the 
child for five days each week. The parties filed motions to either modify the timeshare agreement 
or the physical custody. The district court determined that the parties intended a joint physical 
custody arrangement and ordered a modification to the timeshare. 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court set parameters for the purpose of clarifying which 
timeshare arrangements qualified as joint physical custody. The Court held it is in the child’s 
best interest to have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with each parent and to 
encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing.5  The child’s best 
interest is paramount in custody matters. Further, there is a presumption that joint physical 
custody is in the best interests of a child. The 40-percent custody threshold serves as a baseline to 
achieve these aims. 
 Here, The Court held that the district court looked solely to the 40-percent guideline in 
modifying the custody agreement and did not consider the child’s best interest. Further, the Court 
held the 40-percent guideline in Rivero should not be so rigidly applied that it would preclude 
joint physical custody when the court has broad discretion in using the child’s best interest for 
custodial designations. Moreover, the child’s best interest is especially important when one 
parent has the child for almost 40 percent of the time and the timeshare allows the child to have 
frequent associations with each parent. Finally, the Court held it is important to look for the 
child’s best interest when one parent requests a modification solely to decrease child support 
obligation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The district court abused its discretion by not looking towards the child’s best interest 
when modifying the parties’ custodial agreement to designate Ellen as primary physical 
custodian. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
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